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ABSTRACT 
 
Levelling the Playing Field: 
The Effects of Slovenia’s 2013 Labour Market Reform* 
 
We examine the effects of a 2013 labour market reform in Slovenia which made permanent 
contracts less restrictive and fixed-term contracts more restrictive. Using matched employer-
employee database covering the entirety of Slovenia’s labour market participants, we 
compare the difference in outcomes for workers employed under permanent vs. fixed-term 
contracts before and after the legislative change. We find that the reform achieved both its 
stated goals of reducing labour market segmentation and improving access to jobs for 
vulnerable groups: (i) it increased the probability of accessing permanent jobs via transitions 
from both fixed-term jobs and unemployment, and (ii) it improved the accessibility of 
permanent jobs for both young and old workers. 
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 1. Background and summary   
 
In the recent past, the Slovenian labour market was often regarded as rigid and segmented, 
thus posing a barrier to faster economic growth and hindering the employment of vulnerable 
groups. Before the adoption of the Employment Relations Act in 2013, Slovenian 
employment protection legislation (EPL) was one of the most rigid among OECD countries 
and the EU, especially regarding the hiring and firing of permanent workers. The OECD 
index of EPL strictness in 2008 was 2.76, placing Slovenia in 20th place among the 25 EU 
Member States (Laporšek and Dolenc, 2012). As a consequence, the labour market was highly 
segmented between workers with permanent contracts, with a rich set of benefits, and those 
on fixed-term contracts, with meagre protections and benefits. Moreover, the weak ability of 
firms to adjust to labour market changes – as documented, among others, by the World 
Economic Forum (2016) – was increasingly viewed as a hindrance to the competitiveness of 
the Slovenian economy. 
 
In Slovenia, the segmentation along the permanent vs. fixed-term divide has become 
increasingly pronounced and has particularly affected young workers. In 2011-12, the 
incidence of fixed-term contracts in Slovenia was 17.5 percent, compared with 13.5 for the 
non-weighted average of OECD countries; Slovenia’s share only lagged behind Poland, 
Portugal and Spain among European OECD countries (OECD, 2014). Similarly, the share of 
fixed-term contracts among new hires has been among the highest in the EU (European 
Commission, 2010; OECD, 2014). Young workers have been particularly hurt by this 
dichotomy. In 2011, the incidence of temporary contracts (fixed-term, casual, and other 
temporary work contracts) among 15-29 year olds in Slovenia was 49.7 percent, compared to 
29.3 percent for European OECD countries – placing Slovenia at the very top of that list (see 
also European Commission, 2010, for analysis of earlier periods).1 Moreover, while in the 
majority of European countries young workers have better chances of moving from a fixed-
term to a permanent contract than older workers, Slovenia is one of few countries where the 
opposite is true (European Commission, 2010). 
 
The 2013 Employment Relations Act introduced significant changes aimed at reducing 
segmentation and increasing labour market flexibility. On the segmentation front, the law 
reduced the difference in costs between employing a worker under a fixed-term and a 
permanent contract. For fixed-term workers it introduced severance pay, increased the 
unemployment insurance contribution rate, and restricted the leeway for contract extensions. 
For permanent workers it reduced the level of severance pay and the advance notice period as 
well as, above all, significantly simplified procedures for the dismissal of permanent workers. 
On the flexibility front – beyond reducing firing costs of workers under the permanent 
contract – the law allowed for more flexible deployment of workers and introduced the option 
of monetary compensation instead of reinstatement, among others. As the result of these 
changes, the strictness of EPL, as measured by the OECD EPL index, decreased for both 
                                                          
1 Data on incidence of temporary contracts is computed from: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do. 
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 permanent and temporary contracts, with the former being just below and the latter just above 
the average for OECD countries (see Section 2 below). 
 
The effects of EPL on labour market outcomes has been a subject of a large body of 
theoretical and empirical literature, focusing on the impact on the level of employment and 
unemployment, on job and worker flows, and on the differential effects on various groups of 
workers. Most studies find insignificant and some negative effects of rigid EPL on the level of 
employment, and no effect on unemployment (see recent reviews by Boeri, 2011, and 
Betcherman, 2012). More unambiguous are the results on the effects on labour market 
dynamics. Recent micro econometric studies indicate that strict regulations negatively affect 
worker and job flows and thus labour market transitions. For example, Autor et al. (2007) 
show that the adoption of wrongful-discharge protections by state courts in the United States 
had a negative effect on job flows and firm entry. Similarly, Kugler (1999, 2004) find that 
reduction in dismissal costs increased accessions as well as separations of workers in 
Colombia. The negative impact of employment protection on turnover was confirmed also by 
cross-country studies performed on aggregate data (Gomez-Salvador et al., 2004; Messina and 
Vallanti, 2007; Boeri and Garibaldi, 2009), as well as by studies using difference-in-
differences approaches on OECD countries (see Micco and Pages, 2006; Haltiwanger et al., 
2014; Bassanini et al., 2010; Cingano et al., 2010; and OECD, 2010).  
 
Particularly interesting for the present study are results concerning the effects of partial EPL 
reforms in Southern European countries, which typically reduced the stringency of fixed-term 
contracts while keeping EPL for permanent contracts unchanged. Bentolila et al. (2008) show 
that a 1984 Spanish reform liberalizing fixed-term contracts led to a strong substitution of 
permanent with fixed-term contracts (whose share in aggregate employment reached 35 
percent in the early 1990s), an increase in worker turnover rate, and a reduction in the long-
term unemployment rate. Because firms used layoffs as a normal practice, the conversion 
rates into permanent contracts were reduced from 18 percent in 1987 to 5 percent in 1994. 
Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (2014) also find that the reform mildly increased total 
employment and firm productivity. The findings of Blanchard and Landier (2002) in the case 
of France are similar. Following the introduction of fixed-term contracts in early 1980s for 
workers aged 20-24, the proportion of fixed-term contracts significantly increased and 
conversion rates from temporary to permanent work decreased. The duration of 
unemployment and probability of becoming unemployed decreased as well, but only in the 
early period. In Italy, a reform in the early 1990s introduced higher costs for unjust dismissals 
of permanent workers for businesses below 15 workers. That resulted in more intensive use of 
temporary contracts and had negligible effect on net employment (Kugler and Pica, 2008). 
Boeri and Jimeno (2005) also find that stricter EPL reduces dismissals of permanent workers 
as compared to fixed-term workers. 
The objective of this study is to rigorously evaluate whether the 2013 Employment Relations 
Act levelled the playing field: whether it reduced labour market segmentation between 
permanent and fixed-term workers, and improved access to jobs of young and old workers. 
Year-to-year growth rates of employment under permanent contracts have increased under the 
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 new law, particularly for young workers (15-29 year olds) and first-time jobseekers, and there 
are signs of increased flows between the state of unemployment and employment (Working 
group on labour market legislation changes of the Republic of Slovenia, 2014). Of course, 
comparisons of indicators and aggregate data may be misleading, as they do not account for 
changes in the macroeconomic environment or for composition effects (for example, 
characteristics of the unemployment pool may change if there is a one-time wave of 
bankruptcies). Obtaining more nuanced insights and certainly pinpointing causality 
underlying studied relationships requires more sophisticated, for example, quasi-experimental 
methods, such as the ones employed below. 
 
To identify the effects of legislative changes, the study uses a “double difference” approach. 
The specific nature of the labour market reform – the fact that employment protection for 
permanent workers became less restrictive and for fixed-term workers more restrictive – 
allows the identification of the effects by comparing differences in labour market outcomes 
for these two groups before and after the change of law.  
 
The key findings of the paper are as follows.  Confronting labour market segmentation, the 
new law increased the probability of accessing permanent jobs via transitions from both 
unemployment and fixed-term jobs (including via the conversion of fixed-term to permanent 
contracts with the same employer). The reform also helped vulnerable groups:  the probability 
of accessing permanent jobs increased disproportionally for both young and old workers.  
 
In what follows, we first describe the goals and relevant features of the 2013 legislative 
changes. We also discuss how these changes compare to other countries’ recent reforms as 
measured by the OECD EPL index. This discussion sets the background for a description of 
the main research questions as well as for the methodology, including the double-difference 
approach, of addressing them. Next, we describe the comprehensive matched employer-
employee database that is used for the empirical analysis. We then motivate the empirical 
analysis by describing the aggregate transitions between labour market states and present the 
results of individual-level transition regressions. The final section concludes. 
 
2. Key changes introduced by the 2013 Employment Relations Act 
 
The new Employment Relations Act (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, no. 
21/2013) came into effect on April 12, 2013 as part of a comprehensive labour market reform 
aiming at establishing an adequate balance between employment security and flexibility. The 
new law pursued three main goals: (i) reducing labour market segmentation, (ii) increasing 
flexibility, and (iii) strengthening the legal protection of workers. To reduce labour market 
segmentation, the new law reduced costs associated with permanent employment (including 
simplification of procedures for firing) and increased costs associated with fixed-term 
employment. The new law also strengthened legal protection in areas where workers in the 
past were subject to insufficient protection or misuse. 
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 (a) Reduction of labour market segmentation 
 
One of the major goals of the new Employment Relations Act was to foster employment 
under permanent contracts while curbing employment under fixed-term contract, as well as to 
stimulate the employment of older workers. Important changes introduced by the law include 
the following:  
i. Reduction of the cost difference associated with employment under permanent 
vs. fixed-term contracts. Associated changes are as follows: 
 Employment under permanent contracts was made more attractive, from the point 
of view of employers, by:  
o Shortening advance notice and monetary costs of layoffs. In particular, the 
maximum advance notification period was shortened, in case of business 
reasons, from 120 to 60 days. Severance pay in cases of layoffs for 
business reasons or incapacity was also reduced, and severance pay upon 
retirement as well as in-kind work benefits were, under certain 
circumstances, limited.2 Moreover, a number of provisions have been 
delegated to collective agreements (if they exist), including transportation 
allowances and wage premium associated with work experience. 
o Simplification of procedures for termination of employment under 
permanent contracts. For example, before laying off a worker the employer 
is no longer liable to offer him/her another suitable job within the firm; the 
employer can terminate the probationary period before the planned end, 
and the new law no longer calls for reinstatement and allows that monetary 
compensation is paid instead. 
o Exemption from payment of unemployment insurance contributions for the 
first two years for permanent contract hires. 
 Employment under fixed-term contracts was made more restrictive and less 
attractive by: 
o Limitations on to the use of fixed-term contracts: the maximum duration of 
fixed-term contract (or a series of uninterrupted fixed-term contracts related 
to the same work positon) is two years. 
o Introduction of severance pay for fixed-term contracts.  
o The imposition of five-fold higher contribution rate for unemployment 
insurance in duration of two years for hires under fixed-term contract. 
o Limitations on the use of temporary work agency workers employed under 
fixed-term contracts. 
 
ii. Increasing access to jobs of vulnerable groups. With the goal of increasing employment 
opportunities for older workers, the new Employment Relations Act introduced two types 
of changes. First, it raised the age threshold at which workers are granted special 
                                                          
2 The relevant reductions in severance pay are as follows: under the previous law, workers with 5-10 years of 
tenure were entitled to an average of 1.9 months of severance pay, to be contrasted with 1.5 months under the 
new law; and workers with 16-20 years of tenure were previously entitled to an average of 6 months of severance 
pay, to be contrasted with 4.5 months under the new law. 
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 protection against dismissal. Starting with 2017, special protection against dismissal will 
be given to workers who fulfil the age requirement of 58 years or to workers who 
otherwise do not meet the age requirement but who qualify for retirement within five 
years (in the interim period, the age threshold is to be synchronized with the retirement 
age that also being gradually raised). Second, the dismissal protection is not granted to 
workers who, at the time of hiring, already past the threshold of protection dismissal 
(however, protection dismissal is kept by workers who conclude a new contract by 
forfeiting present employment).   
 
(b) Increase of labour market flexibility  
 
Several measures aimed at reducing labour market segmentation served to also increase 
labour market flexibility. These are the measures aimed at making employment protection 
under permanent contract less strict, as well as measures aimed at reducing special protection 
of older workers (see above). In addition to these measures, the new Employment Relations 
Act also increased labour market flexibility by: 
 Reducing limits on the use of temporary agency workers, particularly in cases where 
the workers employed by these agencies under permanent contracts.  
 Making the use of labour more flexible within the firm by (i) increasing possibilities 
for internal redeployment, and (ii) introducing temporary lay-offs, whereby a worker 
can be laid off for up to six months a year, with the employer being responsible for 
paying out 80 percent of the wage (and not 100 percent as under the old law).  
 During the layoff advance notification period, granting the worker a right to participate 
one day per week in employment programs organized by public employment offices. 
 
Note, however, that the 2013 Employment Relations Act includes also some provisions that 
impede labour market flexibility. These provisions, above all, relate to limitations on the use 
and the increase of costs of fixed-term contracts (see above). 
 
(c) Strengthening the legal protection of workers 
 
The most important measures of the new Employment Relations Act in this area include:  
 Mandatory inclusion in the employment contract of the reason for fixed-term 
employment. 
 Limitation of the number of fixed-term temporary work agency workers deployed at a 
firm. 
 Granting a right to severance pay in the case of unsatisfactory probationary work. 
 
After the introduction of the new Employment Relations Act, the strictness of EPL in 
Slovenia, as measured by the OECD EPL index, fell considerably. Above all, the EPL index 
for individual and collective dismissals (permanent contracts) decreased from 2.67 to 2.39 
(which is still slightly above the non-weighted average for OECD countries of 2.28), while the 
EPL index for individual dismissals for permanent contracts dropped to 1.99, just below the 
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 OECD average of 2.04 (Table 1). Despite the increase in rigidity associated with fixed-term 
contracts, the EPL index for temporary contracts also decreased, from 2.50 to 2.13 – a change 
that came about because the decrease in the restrictions on the use of temporary work agencies 
outweighed the increase restrictiveness on fixed-term contracts.3 Despite the decrease, the 
EPL index for temporary contracts remains slightly above the non-weighted average for 
OECD countries of 2.08. 
 
Table 1: OECD index of the strictness of employment protection legislation in Slovenia, 
before and after the enactment of 2013 Employment Relations Act 
 
Individual 
and 
collective 
dismissals 
(permanent 
contracts) 
Individual 
dismissals 
(permanent 
contracts) 
Collective 
dismissals 
(additional 
restrictions) 
Temporary 
contracts 
Slovenia – 2013, old Employment 
Relations Act 2.67 2.39 3.38 2.50 
Slovenia – 2013, new Employment 
Relations Act 2.39 1.99 3.38 2.13 
OECD average – 2013 (unweighted) 2.28 2.04 2.90 2.08 
 
Source: http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm (retrieved Dec. 20, 2015). 
It is useful to put the nature and intensity of the Slovenia’s 2013 reform in further perspective. 
Using the classifications introduced by Boeri (2011), the introduction of the 2013 Slovenian 
Employment Relations Act can be labelled as “complete” (rather than “two-tier”), as the share 
of the population potentially affected by the reform represents more than 50 percent of the 
potentially eligible population. Moreover, the reform may also be labelled as “incremental“ 
(rather than “discrete”), as the regulatory change lags behind changes in many other countries 
– see the comparison of the intensity of the changes in the indices of individual dismissals 
(permanent contracts) and temporary contracts in Slovenian and in other OECD countries in 
Figure 1.4 
                                                          
3 Note that the OECD Index of strictness of temporary contracts fails to account for two specific features 
introduced by the 2013 Employment Relations Act, namely for the imposition of (i) the obligation of paying 
severance pay to fixed-term workers, and (ii) higher contribution rate for unemployment insurance for hires 
under fixed-term as compared to permanent contracts. In that sense, the reduction of the Temporary contracts 
index associated with the introduction of the 2013 law presented in Table 1 is overestimated. 
4 In determining whether Slovenian reform was incremental or discrete, we follow Boeri’s (2011) classification 
only heuristically, not computationally. 
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 Figure 1: Intensity of EPL reforms, Slovenia and other OECD countries, 2008-13 
 
 
 
3. Research questions 
 
The significant changes introduced by the 2013 Employment Relations Act offer an excellent 
opportunity for examining the effect of legislative actions on labour market outcomes. This 
paper focuses on the equity dimension, examining whether, in line with its purported goals, 
the new law reduced labour market segmentation and increased access to jobs for vulnerable 
groups. In particular, the paper addresses the following questions:  
i. Labour market segmentation: Has under the new law the probability of obtaining a 
job under the permanent – as opposed to the fixed-term – contract increased? For 
example, has the probability of obtaining permanent contract increased for workers 
employed under the fixed-term contract?  Similarly, has the probability of obtaining a 
permanent – as compared to fixed-term contract – increased for the unemployed?  
Because the new law reduced the cost difference associated with employment under 
permanent vs. fixed-term contracts, the working hypothesis is “yes” for both cases.  
ii. Access to jobs for vulnerable groups:  
 Has the new law increased the probability of accessing a permanent, as opposed a 
fixed-term, job for young workers? Theoretical predictions (Blanchard, 2000) 
suggest so, as rigid EPL reduces the availability of jobs for vulnerable groups, 
especially for young people, because employers prefer to employ workers with 
previous experience to reduce the possibility of bad choices.  
 Similarly, for old workers, particularly for those unemployed – has the new law 
improved their probability of obtaining a permanent, as opposed a fixed-term, job? 
Improving the employability of old workers was one of the explicit goals of the 
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 new law, and the law both raised the age threshold at which workers are granted 
special protection against dismissal as well as removed the dismissal protection to 
some groups of old workers (see above). 
 
As a future task, we intend to broaden the scope of research by studying the effects of the 
2013 Employment Relations Act on worker and job flows, as well as on productivity, at the 
firm level.  
 
4. Methodology and data  
 
Below we outline the strategy to identify labour market and productivity effects of the 
legislative changes, and then present the specification of models to be estimated. 
  
(a) Identification strategy 
 
Identification of the impact of legislative changes takes advantage of the specific nature of the 
labour market reform that allows the use of quasi-experimental approach. The 2013 labour 
reform made employment under permanent contracts less restrictive, and under fixed-term 
contracts more restrictive, which allows the use of difference-in-differences methodology to 
identify the reform effects (comparing the difference in outcomes for workers employed under 
permanent vs. fixed-term contracts, before and after the legislative change).  
 
(b) Estimation model of worker transitions 
 
To analyse the impact of the changed legislation on transitions between various labour 
market states, we employ a multinomial logistic regression framework. Under this 
framework, individuals can transition into multiple, competing states – in our case, into 
permanent or fixed-term employment contracts (at either an existing or another employer, if 
applicable), unemployment (with or without unemployment benefits), or inactivity. Each of 
these J competing states are associated with a specific monthly transition probability  
Pr(𝑦𝑡+1 = 𝑚|𝑿𝒕, 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑏) =  
exp(𝑿𝒕`𝛽𝑚|𝑏)
∑ exp (𝑿𝒕`𝛽𝑗|𝑏
𝐽
𝑗=1 )
 , with 𝑚 = 1, … , 𝐽  (1) 
 
where 𝑚 denotes one of the 𝐽 labour market states, 𝑏 is the base category, and 𝑿 is a set of 
control variables. For example, taking fixed-term employment (Efixed) as the base category, 
the probability of receiving a permanent contract at the same employer (Eperm) can be 
expressed as 
Pr(𝑦𝑡+1 = 𝐸𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚|𝑿𝒕, 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐸𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑) =  
exp(𝑿𝒕`𝛽𝐸𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚|𝑏=𝐸𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑)
1+∑ exp (𝑿𝒕`𝛽𝑗|𝑏=𝐸𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
𝐽
𝑗=2 )
   (2) 
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 The results we present are expressed as the ratio of the predicted probabilities of a given 
outcome compared to the baseline outcome; e.g. in the case above, the relative probability of a 
conversion from a fixed-term contract to a permanent contract is: 
Pr(𝑦𝑡+1 = 𝐸𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚|𝑿𝒕, 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐸𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑)
Pr(𝑦𝑡+1 = 𝐸𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑|𝑿𝒕, 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐸𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑)
=  exp(𝑿𝒕`𝛽𝐸𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚|𝑏=𝐸𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑)  (3) 
 
The example presented in (3) can identify the causal effect of the increased rigidity in fixed-
term contracts and decreased rigidity on permanent contracts via double differences: (i) by 
comparing the two, differentially-affected labour segments, and (ii) by exploiting the time-
series variation. To account for the latter, the set of explanatory variables 𝑿 contains an 
indicator variable for the time period after which the reforms were enacted. Because the 
reforms went into effect on April 12th, 2013, we exclude the month of April from the analysis 
by including an indicator variable for that month. Furthermore, when labour market state 𝑦𝑡 
pertains to unemployment, we include a dummy variable controlling for receipt of 
unemployment benefits. In addition, the explanatory variables 𝑿 contain variables for 
demographic characteristics (gender, age, education) and monthly control variables to account 
for seasonality in worker separations and accessions. 
(c) Data description   
 
The study takes advantage of an exceptionally rich database, created by the merger of 
administrative data covering the entire Slovenian workforce. The database contains 
information on the history of employment, unemployment and wages for the entire work 
career for each individual for the 1991-2014 period. Each employment spell is linked with the 
financial and other information of the employer, with all firms in Slovenia being included (the 
so-called matched employer-employee database). The following data sets are included in the 
combined database: 
(a) Work history data set. It contains the information on the starting and ending date 
of an employment spell, the type of appointment, occupation, employer 
identification code, and personal characteristics (gender, age, and education). 
Through the employer identification code, each employment spell is linked to 
accounting data on the current employer. 
(b) Data set on registered unemployed. It contains starting and ending date, 
destination of exit, as well as information on the receipt of unemployment 
insurance benefits. Some additional personal and family characteristics, pertaining 
to each spell, are also included.  
(c) Workers' earnings data set. It contains information on earnings associated with 
each post-1991 employment spell of an individual (amount of earnings, number of 
hours worked, starting and ending date of earnings period). 
(d) Accounting data on enterprises. Data consist of the yearly profit and loss 
statements, as well as balance sheets, for all incorporated businesses in Slovenia. 
(e) Slovenian Business Registry data set includes information on the four-digit 
industry, the year the firm started operating, and the firm’s type and ownership 
9
 structure (private and state ownership, ownership by domestic and foreign owners, 
and whether a firm is a publicly traded stock company or a limited liability 
company). 
 
The resulting database that is the basis for this analysis contains over 18 million observations 
at the level of monthly individual states (Table A1). These span the period from April 2012 to 
May 2014. The large majority of these observations refer to permanent employment, 
mirroring the fact that permanent employment comprises the largest share of stock of labour 
market participants. Men tend to be disproportionally represented among the unemployed and 
in fixed-term contracts relative to their share in permanent employment; the lesser-educated 
tend to be disproportionally unemployed, while the highest-educated tend to be 
disproportionally employed on permanent contracts. Interestingly, the youngest demographic 
group maintains equal shares of employment among both permanent and fixed-term contracts 
– this peculiarity can be explained by a unique feature in the Slovenian labour market, the 
institution of so-called student work. This extremely flexible form of employment represents a 
large share of employment among the youngest population, but is unfortunately not captured 
in our data. 
 
5. Results of empirical analysis 
 
Below we first contrast pre- and post-reform dynamics in aggregate labour market outcomes, 
and then present the results of individual-level transition regressions. 
 
(a) Dynamics of labour market transitions 
 
Aggregate trends on worker accessions following the implementation of the new law suggest 
that it was indeed successful in its goal of reducing labour market segmentation. For example, 
following the introduction of the new law in April 2013, the number of worker accessions on 
permanent contracts increased, while worker accessions on fixed-term contracts decreased 
(Figure 2). While fixed-term contracts still represent the large majority of accessions, their 
relative share decreased from 77 percent in the year prior to the legislative change to 
73 percent in the year following the legislative change. Moreover, the increases in new 
permanent contracts were particularly pronounced among younger workers, those aged 
between 16-29 years. 
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Figure 2: Worker accessions by contract type, one-year periods prior to and after 
legislative change 
 
Note: Period covered under old law refers to April 2012 to March 2013; period covered under new law refers to 
April 2013 to March 2014.  
Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia. 
 
Which segment of the labour market accounted for the increase in permanent-contract 
accessions? Detailed statistics on the monthly probabilities of transitioning from one labour 
market state to another (Table A2) show that the increase in accessions on permanent 
contracts is largely attributable to an increased accessions from fixed-term contracts at other 
employers and accessions from other forms of employment (mainly from self-employment).  
Prior to the legislative change, 1.9 percent of monthly transitions from fixed-term 
employment resulted in permanent contracts at the same employer; in contrast, after the 
legislative change the monthly transition rate increased to 2.4 percent. A large share of the 
increase in accessions to permanent contracts also came from those employed via other 
contract types: in the year following the introduction of the new law, accessions into 
permanent contracts increased by 9.8 percent, of which 4 percentage points are attributable to 
increased inflows from other types of contracts. Accessions from fixed-term contracts had a 
similar contribution to the increase, 3.8 percent.  
 
The transition matrix also highlights a more stagnant nature of the Slovenian labour market 
compared to other EU countries. Bachmann et al (2015), for example, report annual 
persistency rates in permanent employment of 89.7 percent for a panel of 24 EU countries; the 
comparable figure calculated from the Slovenian administrative data is 91.2 percent.5 
Furthermore, exit rates from unemployment to permanent employment averaged 8.8 percent 
in Slovenia, compared to 9.1 percent in EU countries.  
  
                                                          
5 Note that the figures are not directly comparable due to differences in data sources and definitions – Bachmann 
et al (2015) use EU-SILC survey data and directly examine annual persistency rates, while the figures for 
Slovenia are calculated from monthly transition rates. Also note that figures refer to comparable time periods. 
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(b) Results of the estimation of multinomial logit models of labour market transitions 
 
Below we present the results of multinomial regressions of transitions across various labour 
market states. We present three types of transitions: 
 Transition from fixed-term employment  
 Transition from permanent employment 
 Transition from unemployment 
In the estimated models, the following destinations are considered: fixed-term employment, 
permanent employment, unemployment with the receipt of benefits, unemployment without 
the receipt of benefits, inactivity, and other (for example, self-employment). In transition 
models with employment as the origin, a further distinction is made between employment 
with a new as opposed with the current employer (in transition models from permanent 
employment, transition to fixed-term employment with the same employer is ignored, as such 
transitions are very rare).   
 
The estimated models follow the multinomial logit specification from equation (2) above, 
with the key parameter of interest being the parameter showing the difference-in-differences 
effect on the selected outcome (see the methodology section above). As control variables, we 
include gender, age, and education, all expressed as categorical variables. Because outcomes 
by age categories, are of particular interest, models are estimated separately by age categories. 
Relative risk ratios are presented.  
 
i. Transition from fixed-term employment 
 
The new law increased the relative probability of transition from fixed-term to permanent 
contract. We distinguish between two types of these transitions, one in which a fixed-term 
contract is converted into a permanent contract at the same employer, and another where an 
individual gets a permanent position at another employer.  First, as shown in Table A3, under 
the new law the probability of transitioning to a new permanent job with another employer 
increased by 18.9 percent in comparison to the pre-reform period, and the probability of 
transitioning to a new fixed-term job with another employer decreased by 9.9 percent (Table 
A3, coefficients under “New Law”). The relative probability of transitioning to a permanent 
contract (as compared to transitioning to a fixed-term contract) thus increased by 32 percent. 
Second, under the new law the probability of the conversion of a fixed-term to a permanent 
contract by the same employer increased by 28.2 percent.6 Note that this applies for the 
chosen baseline characteristics (men, younger than 30 years, with elementary education). 
Under the new law, the probability of transitions to other destinations (inactivity, covered and 
uncovered unemployment, and other) also changed, but these changes cannot be attributed to 
                                                          
6 Note that in Table A3, the coefficient for “Permanent employment – same employer” under “New law” already 
reflects double difference. In contrast, coefficients under “New law” for “Fixed-term employment – new 
employer” and “Permanent employment – new employer” reflect only the “before-after” difference and a double 
difference is obtained by their division (as coefficients are relative risk ratios). 
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 the change of the law alone as, in all likelihood, they reflect also changes in other 
circumstances. 
 
While not directly tied to the legislative changes, it is interesting to note that the employment 
outcomes generally tend to be superior for men and more highly-educated individuals (Table 
A3). Although they have higher probabilities of transitioning to self-employment, women on 
fixed-term contracts tend to have lower probabilities for continued regular employment in any 
form, permanent or fixed-term, and at either their current or another employer. They also have 
a higher probability of exiting to unemployment (although intriguingly, not inactivity). More 
highly educated individuals, on the other hand, have a higher probability of transitioning into 
permanent contracts (either at their current or at a new employer) and lower probability of 
transitioning into unemployment; similar to women, they have a higher probability of 
becoming self-employed and a lower probability of becoming inactive. 
 
Relative probabilities of transitions from fixed-term employment do not vary strongly across 
age groups. As shown in Table A4, under the new law the probability of transition to a new 
permanent job with another employer increased for all age groups, and the probability of 
transition to a new fixed-term job with another employer decreased, also for all age groups, 
with no group showing particular advantage over the others.  Interestingly, the conversion of a 
fixed-term to a permanent contract by the same employer recorded the highest probability 
among 40 to 49 year-olds. 
 
ii. Transition from permanent employment 
 
The new law increased the relative probability of transition from a permanent to another 
permanent contract with a new employer for both young and old workers. In the aggregate, 
under the new law the probability of transition from a permanent to another permanent 
contract with a new employer decreased by 8.9 percent, nearly precisely by as much as did the 
probability of transition to a fixed-term contract with a new employer, leaving the relative 
probability unchanged (Table A5). But both young and old workers fared better: for young 
(16-29 year olds) relative probability of accessing another permanent contract with a new 
employer increased by 7.6 percent, and for old (those older than 55 years) by 32 percent 
(Table A6). The explanation for the latter effect can be found in the new law: with the 
intention of increasing access to jobs by older workers, dismissal protection stopped to be 
granted to job movers above 55 years old. 
 
Other results show that probabilities of transition from a permanent to another permanent or to 
fixed-term contract with a new employer differ across various groups (Table A5). Women are 
less like to change their employers than man, particularly when exiting to fixed-term 
employment. Interestingly, more educated are less likely to transition from a permanent to a 
fixed-term contract or to another permanent contract with a new employer, except those with 
tertiary education when making transition from a permanent to another permanent job. 
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 iii. Transition from unemployment 
 
Although the new law coincided with an increase in the outflows from unemployment to both 
fixed-term and permanent employment, the increase in outflows to permanent employment 
was significantly greater.7 Transitions into permanent contracts increased by 12.1 percent, 
whereas transitions into fixed-term contracts increased by only 2.7 percent (a difference that is 
statistically significant). Interestingly, transitions into self-employment decreased, a finding 
that is attributable to the fact that subsidies for self-employment were offered to the 
unemployed to a greater extent in the year prior to the change in legislation.  
 
Transitions from unemployment document that the new law improved accessibility of 
permanent jobs for both young and old workers. While for younger workers, the exit rate 
increased to both fixed-term and permanent employment, by 15.3 percent and 29.4 percent, 
the increase to permanent employment was statistically significantly larger (and amounted to 
12.2 percent, taking the ratio of the two coefficients) – see Table A8. For older workers, the 
exit rate to fixed-term employment decreased by almost 30 percent while the exit rate to 
permanent employment increased, although the latter was not statistically significant relative 
to the baseline of remaining unemployed. Relative to exiting to fixed-term employment, 
however, the change was statistically significant and large in magnitude, amounting to 62 
percent. For the other age groups, the relative probabilities to exit unemployment into either 
fixed-term or permanent employment were not statistically significantly different from each 
other. 
 
The finding that transitions into permanent employment increased significantly for the oldest 
group of workers can be explained by legislative changes which selectively reduced the firing 
costs for precisely these workers while leaving them unchanged for younger ones. Prior to the 
implementation of the new law, workers aged 55 and over were categorically guaranteed job 
security; layoffs were possible only in cases of gross negligence. As explained above, 
according to the new law, this special protection no longer applies for new hires who are 
above the age threshold at the time of the hire.8 As such, employers have a much stronger 
incentive to hire older workers who are above the age threshold, while continued disincentives 
are in place for hiring workers just below the age threshold (who will soon be subject to the 
increased job security). 
 
The exit rates from unemployment into employment across demographic characteristics are 
consistent with those found in other studies (e.g. Bachmann et al, 2015). Women are found to 
have lower rates of exiting unemployment to either permanent or fixed-term employment than 
men, but not to self-employment. Exit rates into regular employment decrease with age, while 
exit rates into self-employment increase with age (although in general, exit rates into self-
                                                          
7 Note that the statistics reported here refer to exits from both covered and uncovered unemployment. 
8 The precise stipulations for what constitutes an older workers are slightly more complicated: they were lower 
for women prior to April 2013, are gradually increasing over time, and are also linked to the age at which 
individuals may retire. These factors are taken into account in the empirical analysis but are not referred to in the 
text for simplicity of exposition. 
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 employment are much lower than into regular employment). Finally, higher levels of 
education are associated with much higher exit rates into employment in general, and 
permanent or self-employment in particular. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The results of the paper indicate that the 2013 Employment Relations Act achieved its stated 
goals of reducing labour market segmentation as well as improving access to jobs of 
vulnerable groups. On the labour market segmentation front, the new law increased the 
probability of accessing permanent jobs:  (i) the probability of conversion from a fixed-term 
to a permanent contract with the same employer increased, (ii) workers employed under fixed-
term contracts increased the probability of obtaining a permanent rather than fixed-term job 
with another employer, and (iii) unemployed workers increased the probability of obtaining a 
permanent rather than fixed-term job. On the vulnerable groups front, the new law improved 
accessibility of permanent jobs both for young and old workers. Young workers can better 
access permanent jobs via transitions from unemployment and from permanent contract; old 
workers can better access permanent jobs via transitions from unemployment as well as from 
another permanent job. 
 
How can the paper’s results be interpreted? Slovenia’s 2013 new Employment Relations Act 
reduced job security for permanent workers and increased the costs associated with fixed-term 
employment. This stands in contrast with reforms in countries that traditionally have had strict 
EPL, especially in Southern Europe, where for reasons of political expediency easing of 
protection has been achieved by expanding the scope for fixed-term contracts rather than 
reducing job security for permanent workers. Our results show that Slovenia’s strategy has 
paid off.  Rather than increasing the segmentation – dualism – of labour markets, the result 
produced by countries that expanded the scope for fixed-term contracts (see above on the 
effects of partial labour market reforms), Slovenia decreased labour market segmentation. 
And by increasing flexibility, the 2013 reform also improved job accessibility for vulnerable 
groups – for both young and old workers. The “completeness of the reform” – the fact that the 
reform affected both fixed-term and permanent contracts – may well have contributed to these 
outcomes.  
The above results need to be qualified in several ways. First, the results are of partial 
equilibrium nature, thus ignoring general equilibrium effects of the new law. Such effects can 
be substantial and involve, among others, interactions between temporary and permanent 
contracts (for a theoretical modelling of “two-tier reforms,” see Boeri 2011). Second, the 
presented results are preliminary, as applying the analysis to longer time series may improve 
the reliability of the results and, by investigating longer-term effects, increase their richness. 
Third, the results focus on a limited set of outcomes, so extending the analysis to other 
outcomes that may be affected by the new law – including effects on wages and productivity – 
would help producing a more balanced view of the impact of the law. 
In our future research we intend to complement the outcomes studied above by examining the 
impact of the new law on worker and job flows, as well as on productivity at the firm level. 
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 The research of separations and accessions of permanent and fixed-term workers, both by type 
of workers and in aggregate, will shed light on the general equilibrium results and thus 
provide a more complete picture about the effects of the 2013 Law than partial equilibrium 
results presented above. We also plan to study the impact on the new law on firm-level 
productivity, as these results lead to broader questions regarding effects of the reforms. For 
example, has the 2013 Employment Relations Act increased the competiveness of the 
Slovenian economy? In particular, has the new law increased firm-level productivity, as lower 
dismissal costs and less strict dismissal procedures for permanent workers may have enabled 
firms to react quicker to changes in technology and product demand? On the other hand, has 
more restrictive use of fixed-term contracts reduced productivity of firms, as may also be 
conjectured? Moreover, has a lesser effective burden of EPL reduced a firm's incentive to 
invest in firm-specific human capital, reducing the scope for productivity gains in the future? 
Answering such questions will lead to a deeper understanding of the long-term consequences 
of the reforms. 
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Variable
Permanent 
employment
Fixed-term 
employment Unemployed Entire sample
Gender
Men 0.52 0.59 0.54 0.55
Women 0.48 0.41 0.46 0.45
Age
Age under 30 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08
Age 30-39 0.29 0.35 0.22 0.21
Age 40-49 0.33 0.23 0.18 0.22
Age 50-55 0.15 0.08 0.12 0.39
Age 55+ 0.12 0.05 0.22 0.07
Education
Primary education 0.12 0.16 0.19 0.22
Technical secondary education 0.23 0.28 0.25 0.24
General secondary education 0.33 0.30 0.27 0.25
Tertiary education 0.32 0.26 0.13 0.20
Number of observations 13,928,911                2,173,943                 2,009,846                 18,112,700                
Labour market state
Source: Own calculations based on combined unemployment and employment registry data, Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia.
Table A1: Summary statistics of key variables (mean values of binary variables)
Note: Unit of observation is monthly labour market status at the individual level. Data cover two year period prior to and following April 
2013 labour market reform.
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Panel A: Old law
Origin
Fixed-term 
employment - same 
employer
Fixed-term 
employment - new 
employer
Permanent 
employment - same 
employer
Permanent 
employment - new 
employer
Other employment 
(e.g., self-emp.)
Unemployment -
with unemp. 
benefits
Unemployment -
without unemp. 
benefits Inactivity Total
Fixed-term employment 90.6 1.7 1.9 0.5 0.4 2.4 0.7 1.8 100.0
Permanent employment 0.0 0.1 98.9 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.2 100.0
Other employment (e.g., self-employment) 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.2 97.5 0.5 0.1 0.9 100.0
Unemployment (with unemp. benefits) n.a. 4.2 n.a. 1.0 1.2 84.8 0.2 8.6 100.0
Unemployment (without unemp. benefits) n.a. 2.5 n.a. 0.5 0.3 n.a. 93.5 3.0 99.9
Panel B: New law
Origin
Fixed-term 
employment - same 
employer
Fixed-term 
employment - new 
employer
Permanent 
employment - same 
employer
Permanent 
employment - new 
employer
Other employment 
(e.g., self-emp.)
Unemployment -
with unemp. 
benefits
Unemployment -
without unemp. 
benefits Inactivity Total
Fixed-term employment 90.4 1.5 2.4 0.6 0.3 1.9 1.0 2.0 100.0
Permanent employment 0.0 0.1 98.9 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 100.0
Other employment (e.g., self-employment) 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.3 96.8 0.4 0.2 1.4 100.0
Unemployment (with unemp. benefits) n.a. 4.5 n.a. 1.2 0.9 83.0 0.1 10.2 100.0
Unemployment (without unemp. benefits) n.a. 2.4 n.a. 0.5 0.4 n.a. 93.9 2.7 100.0
Panel C: Difference = Panel B-Panel A
Origin
Fixed-term 
employment - same 
employer
Fixed-term 
employment - new 
employer
Permanent 
employment - same 
employer
Permanent 
employment - new 
employer
Other employment 
(e.g., self-emp.)
Unemployment -
with unemp. 
benefits
Unemployment -
without unemp. 
benefits Inactivity Total
Fixed-term employment -0.26 -0.15 0.46 0.09 -0.11 -0.50 0.33 0.14 0.0
Permanent employment 0.00 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.11 0.04 0.06 0.0
Other employment (e.g., self-employment) 0.01 -0.05 0.25 0.04 -0.70 -0.12 0.06 0.51 0.0
Unemployment (with unemp. benefits) n.a. 0.34 n.a. 0.26 -0.29 -1.83 -0.07 1.58 0.0
Unemployment (without unemp. benefits) n.a. -0.09 n.a. -0.03 0.05 n.a. 0.42 -0.32 0.0
Note: Contains averages of monthly transition probabilities for April 2012 to March 2013 (period prior to legislative change) and May 2013 to April 2014 (period after legislative change).
Source: Own calculations based on combined unemployment and employment registry data, Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia.
Destination
Destination
Destination
Table A2: Monthly transition matrix - comparison of old law and new law 
(in percent)
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Permanent 
employment - 
same employer Inactivity
Unemployment  - 
without unemp. 
benefits
Fixed-term 
employment - 
new employer
Permanent 
employment - 
new employer
Unemployment - 
with unemp. 
benefits
Self-
employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Effect of legislative changes (baseline: old law)
New law 1.282*** 1.039*** 1.461*** 0.901*** 1.189*** 0.809*** 0.732***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.023) (0.01) (0.023) (0.008) (0.017)
Gender (baseline: men)
Women 0.945*** 0.713*** 1.527*** 0.721*** 0.810*** 1.437*** 1.790***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.026) (0.01) (0.017) (0.014) (0.045)
Age (baseline: under 30 years old)
Aged 30-39 1.189*** 0.746*** 0.912*** 1.049*** 1.060*** 1.143*** 1.053*
(0.011) (0.01) (0.018) (0.015) (0.023) (0.014) (0.028)
Aged 40-49 1.098*** 0.705*** 1.066*** 1.149*** 1.080*** 1.436*** 0.920**
(0.013) (0.012) (0.024) (0.019) (0.028) (0.02) (0.033)
Aged 50-55 0.910*** 0.666*** 1.458*** 1.028 0.796*** 1.977*** 0.978
(0.018) (0.017) (0.044) (0.027) (0.035) (0.037) (0.054)
Aged 55+ 0.937** 0.666*** 1.185*** 0.802*** 0.539*** 3.082*** 0.813***
(0.024) (0.022) (0.05) (0.03) (0.037) (0.059) (0.059)
Education (baseline: primary school or less)
Secondary school (technical) 1.199*** 0.673*** 1.086*** 0.954*** 1.054* 1.029* 1.191***
(0.017) (0.01) (0.027) (0.016) (0.031) (0.015) (0.052)
Tertiary 1.492*** 0.294*** 0.671*** 0.519*** 1.082** 0.774*** 1.723***
(0.022) (0.006) (0.019) (0.011) (0.035) (0.013) (0.073)
Constant (baseline risk ratio) 0.012*** 0.068*** 0.004*** 0.025*** 0.005*** 0.016*** 0.001***
(0) (0.002) (0) (0.001) (0) (0) (0)
Number of transitions 48,397 39,338 17,578 34,462 11,802 47,479 7,674
Number of observations
Pseudo R-squared
Table A3: Multinomial logit estimates of monthly probability of transition from fixed-term employment to different labour market states
Note: Coefficients denote relative risk ratios obtained from multinomial logit regressions, where relative risk ratios are  defined as the relative probability of observing a given 
outcome relative to the base outcome. Additional covariates included in the regressions include 11 dummy variables for calendar month and a dummy variable for April 2013.  
The regressions are estimated for monthly transitions from April 2012 to April 2014, thus including 12 months before and after the legislative change (in addition to April 2013, 
when the new law went into effect in the middle of the month). *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered 
by individual are in parentheses.
Source: Own calculations based on combined unemployment and employment registry data, Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia.
Relative risk ratio of transition from fixed-term employment into:
2,173,943
0.027
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Permanent 
employment - 
same employer Inactivity
Unemployment  - 
without unemp. 
benefits
Fixed-term 
employment - 
new employer
Permanent 
employment - 
new employer
Unemployment - 
with unemp. 
benefits Self-employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Effects of new law, age-specific effects
Aged 16-29 1.202*** 1.011 1.122*** 0.887*** 1.207*** 0.926*** 0.757***
(0.019) (0.015) (0.027) (0.016) (0.035) (0.015) (0.027)
Aged 30-39 1.541*** 1.122*** 1.681*** 0.930*** 1.193*** 0.808*** 0.771***
(0.027) (0.022) (0.051) (0.019) (0.04) (0.015) (0.032)
Aged 40-49 1.135*** 1.015 1.781*** 0.890*** 1.224*** 0.751*** n.a.
(0.026) (0.025) (0.065) (0.022) (0.053) (0.016)
Aged 50-55 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.768*** n.a.
(0.024)
Aged 55+ n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.543*** n.a.
(0.019)
Table A4: Multinomial logit estimates of monthly probability of transition from fixed-term employment to different labour market states - age-specific effects 
of legislative changes
Relative risk ratio of transition from fixed-term employment into:
Note: Coefficients denote relative risk ratios obtained from separate multinomial logistic regressions estimated by age group. Relative risk ratios are  defined as the relative probability of 
observing a given outcome relative to the base outcome. For each age group, the following covariates are included: Gender, Educations (4 categories), dummy variables for calendar month 
and a dummy variable for April 2013.  "n.a." refers to labour market states/transitions for which there were too few observations for reliable estimates. The regressions are estimated for 
monthly transitions from April 2012 to April 2014, thus including 12 months before and after the legislative change (in addition to April 2013 , when the new law went into effect in the 
middle of the month). *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered by individual are in parentheses.
Source: Own calculations based on combined unemployment and employment registry data, Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia.
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Inactivity
Unemployment  - 
without unemp. 
benefits
Fixed-term 
employment - 
new employer
Permanent 
employment - 
new employer
Unemployment - 
with unemp. 
benefits Self-employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Effect of legislative changes (baseline: old law)
New law 0.850*** 2.384*** 0.913*** 0.911*** 0.602*** 0.654***
(0.011) (0.074) (0.017) (0.009) (0.007) (0.014)
Gender (baseline: men)
Women 0.799*** 0.961 0.602*** 0.818*** 0.857*** 0.900***
(0.01) (0.028) (0.012) (0.009) (0.01) (0.019)
Age (baseline: under 30 years old)
Aged 30-39 0.536*** 0.790*** 0.997 1.310*** 1.224*** 1.363***
(0.013) (0.031) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.041)
Aged 40-49 0.400*** 0.660*** 0.673*** 1.279*** 1.186*** 0.937*
(0.011) (0.027) (0.019) (0.023) (0.024) (0.031)
Aged 50-55 0.772*** 0.764*** 0.577*** 1.179*** 1.603*** 0.747***
(0.022) (0.04) (0.023) (0.027) (0.037) (0.035)
Aged 55+ 5.870*** 1.194*** 0.634*** 0.906*** 2.674*** 0.752***
(0.12) (0.058) (0.026) (0.023) (0.058) (0.036)
Education (baseline: primary school or less)
Secondary school (technical) 0.890*** 1.054 1.162*** 0.985 0.885*** 1.246***
(0.017) (0.045) (0.037) (0.018) (0.015) (0.054)
Secondary school (general) 0.714*** 0.837*** 0.869*** 0.920*** 0.744*** 1.473***
(0.013) (0.036) (0.028) (0.017) (0.013) (0.06)
Tertiary 0.604*** 0.486*** 0.947* 1.226*** 0.477*** 2.045***
(0.012) (0.024) (0.031) (0.022) (0.009) (0.084)
Constant (baseline risk ratio) 0.006*** 0.000*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.001***
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Number of transitions 27,534 5,455 12,006 39,676 31,346 9,967
Number of observations
Pseudo R-squared
Table A5: Multinomial logit estimates of monthly probability of transition from permanent employment to different labour market states
Relative risk ratio of transition from permanent employment into:
13,928,911
0.046
Note: Coefficients denote relative risk ratios obtained from multinomial logistic regressions, where relative risk ratios are defined as the relative probability of observing 
a given outcome relative to the base outcome. Additional covariates included in the regressions include 11 dummy variables for calendar month, a dummy variable for 
April 2013, and dummy variables for proxies of tenure with current employer.  The regressions are estimated for monthly transitions from April 2012 to April 2014, 
thus including 12 months before and after the legislative change (in addition to April 2013, when the new law went into effect in the middle of the month). *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered by individual are in parentheses.
Source: Own calculations based on combined unemployment and employment registry data, Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia.
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Inactivity
Unemployment  - 
without unemp. 
benefits
Fixed-term 
employment - 
new employer
Permanent 
employment - 
new employer
Unemployment - 
with unemp. 
benefits Self-employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (5)
Effects of new law, age-specific effects
Aged 16-29 1.177*** n.a. 1.059 1.140*** 0.718*** 0.695***
(0.042) (0.041) (0.032) (0.024) (0.035)
Aged 30-39 1.255*** n.a. 0.929** 0.946*** 0.711*** 0.700***
(0.043) (0.028) (0.016) (0.016) (0.022)
Aged 40-49 1.126*** 3.725*** 0.903*** 0.869*** 0.720*** 0.619***
(0.042) (0.25) (0.034) (0.015) (0.016) (0.025)
Aged 50-55 0.912** 3.658*** 0.890* 0.839*** 0.599*** 0.616***
(0.04) (0.38) (0.06) (0.025) (0.019) (0.048)
Aged 55+ 0.639*** 2.086*** 0.553*** 0.730*** 0.303*** 0.474***
(0.011) (0.172) (0.042) (0.027) (0.01) (0.042)
Table A6: Multinomial logit estimates of monthly probability of transition from permanent employment to different labour market states - age-
specific effects of legislative changes
Relative risk ratio of transition from permanent employment into:
Note: Coefficients denote relative risk ratios of multinomial logit regressions estimated for each age group separately, where relative risk ratios are  defined as the relative 
probability of observing a given outcome relative to the base outcome. For each age group, the following covariates are included: Gender, Educations (4 categories), 
dummy variables for calendar month, a dummy variable for April 2013 and dummy variables for proxies of tenure with current employer.  "n.a." refers to labour market 
states/transitions for which there were too few observations for reliable estimates. The regressions are estimated for monthly transitions from April 2012 to April 2014, 
thus including 12 months before and after the legislative change (in addition to April 2013 , when the new law went into effect in the middle of the month). *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered by individual are in parentheses.
Source: Own calculations based on combined unemployment and employment registry data, Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia.
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Fixed-term 
employment - new 
employer
Permanent 
employment - new 
employer Self-employment
(1) (2) (3)
Effect of legislative changes (baseline: old law)
New law 1.027*** 1.121*** 0.852***
(0.009) (0.019) (0.016)
Gender (baseline: men)
Women 0.688*** 0.617*** 0.99
(0.008) (0.012) (0.02)
Age (baseline: under 30 years old)
Aged 30-39 0.843*** 0.899*** 1.474***
(0.012) (0.02) (0.037)
Aged 40-49 0.862*** 0.819*** 1.591***
(0.014) (0.021) (0.045)
Aged 50-55 0.751*** 0.529*** 1.797***
(0.017) (0.02) (0.065)
Aged 55+ 0.474*** 0.188*** 1.274***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.051)
Education (baseline: primary school or less)
Secondary school (technical) 1.864*** 2.129*** 2.123***
(0.032) (0.066) (0.076)
Secondary school (general) 1.757*** 2.593*** 3.202***
(0.03) (0.078) (0.108)
Tertiary 2.420*** 4.226*** 5.794***
(0.046) (0.137) (0.208)
Constant (baseline risk ratio) 0.078*** 0.021*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.001) (0)
Number of transitions 68,302 15,521 13,225
Number of observations
Pseudo R-squared
Table A7: Multinomial logit estimates of monthly probability of transition from unemployment to different 
labour market states
Relative risk ratio of transition from unemployment into:
2,009,846
0.172
Note: Coefficients denote relative risk ratios obtained from multinomial logistic regressions, where relative risk ratios are  
defined as the relative probability of observing a given outcome relative to the base outcome. Additional covariates included in 
the regressions include a dummy variable for receipt of unemployment benefits, 11 dummy variables for calendar month and a 
dummy variable for April 2013.  The regressions are estimated for monthly transitions from April 2012 to April 2014, thus 
including 12 months before and after the legislative change (in addition to April 2013, when the new law went into effect in the 
middle of the month). *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors 
clustered by individual are in parentheses.
Source: Own calculations based on combined unemployment and employment registry data, Statistical Office of the Republic of 
Slovenia.
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Fixed-term employment - 
new employer
Permanent employment - 
new employer Self-employment
(1) (2) (3)
Effects of new law, age-specific effects
Aged 16-29 1.153*** 1.294*** 1.407***
(0.016) (0.034) (0.049)
Aged 30-39 1.006 1.05 0.952
(0.016) (0.032) (0.031)
Aged 40-49 1.033* 1.062 0.717***
(0.019) (0.04) (0.028)
Aged 50-55 0.900*** 0.912 0.455***
(0.025) (0.061) (0.026)
Aged 55+ 0.717*** 1.161 0.331***
(0.026) (0.128) (0.025)
Table A8: Multinomial logit estimates of monthly probability of transition from unemployment to different labour 
market states - age-specific effects of legislative changes
Relative risk ratio of transition from unemployment into:
Note: Coefficients denote relative risk ratios obtained from separate multinomial logistic regressions estimated by age group. Relative risk 
ratios are  defined as the relative probability of observing a given outcome relative to the base outcome. For each age group, the following 
covariates are included: Gender, Educations (4 categories), dummy variables for calendar month and a dummy variable for April 2013.  
"n.a." refers to labour market states/transitions for which there were too few observations for reliable estimates. The regressions are 
estimated for monthly transitions from April 2012 to April 2014, thus including 12 months before and after the legislative change (in 
addition to April 2013 , when the new law went into effect in the middle of the month). *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered by individual are in parentheses.
Source: Own calculations based on combined unemployment and employment registry data, Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia.
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